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1Secure Multiuser Scheduling in Downlink Dual-hop
Regenerative Relay Networks over Nakagami-m
Fading Channels
Maoqiang Yang, Student Member, IEEE, Daoxing Guo, Member, IEEE, Yuzhen Huang, Member, IEEE, Trung Q.
Duong, Senior Member, IEEE, and Bangning Zhang
Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the secrecy performance
of multiuser dual-hop relay networks where a base station (BS)
communicates with multiple legitimate users via the assistance
of a trustful regenerative relay in the presence of multiple eaves-
droppers. Particularly, the maximal ratio transmission (MRT)
scheme is exploited at the BS and a threshold-based multiuser
scheduling scheme is employed over the legitimate users, while
concerning the imperfect decoding at the regenerative relay. To
evaluate the secrecy performance of the considered system, two
practical situations are addressed based on the availability of
eavesdropper’s channel state information (CSI), i.e., Scenario I,
where the eavesdropper’s CSI is not available at the relay, and
Scenario II, where the eavesdropper’s CSI is available at the
relay. For both scenarios, we further consider two eavesdropping
modes, i.e., colluding eavesdropping and non-colluding eaves-
dropping. For Scenario I, new exact and asymptotic closed-form
expressions of the secrecy outage probability (SOP) are derived.
For Scenario II, we derive new exact and asymptotic closed-
form expressions of ergodic secrecy rate (ESR). The asymptotic
SOPs demonstrate that the secrecy diversity order is independent
of the number of legitimate users NB and eavesdroppers NE,
the number of antennas equipped at eavesdroppers AE as well
as fading factor of the wiretap channel mE. Furthermore, we
also determine the secrecy multiplexing gain and the power
cost to explicitly quantify the impact of the legitimate channel
and wiretap channel on ergodic secrecy rate. Our findings
demonstrate that increasing the switching threshold, the number
of antennas at the BS, and the number of legitimate users have
a positive impact on secrecy performance.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, cooperative relay, mul-
tiuser diversity, threshold-based scheduling scheme, secrecy out-
age probability, ergodic secrecy rate.
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SECURE information transmission has aroused extensiveinterest from the wireless communications community in
order to prevent eavesdroppers from taking advantage of the
broadcast nature of radio propagation medium to intercept
confidential messages. Conventionally, various cryptographic
protocols have been developed and applied in the upper
layers to achieve transmission security on the assumption
of an error-free link in the physical layer. Nevertheless, the
limitations behind these cryptographic protocols lie in secret
key distribution and management, as well as its extreme
computational complexity of mathematical operations [1]. Al-
ternatively, physical layer security (PLS) has been introduced
as an attractive means to guarantee secure transmission by
exploiting the distinct characteristics of wireless channels (e.g.,
fading or noise). The concept of PLS was first introduced in
Shannon’s pioneering work [2] from an information theoretic
perspective. Subsequently, wiretap channel was introduced in
[3], where it demonstrated that perfect security can be obtained
when the quality of legitimate channel is superior to that of
the wiretap channel.
In recent years, a considerable amount of research has been
devoted to incorporating multiple-antenna techniques, which
provide additional spatial degrees of freedom (DoF), to further
improve PLS. To be specific, maximal ratio transmission
(MRT) or transmit antenna selection (TAS) schemes can be
exploited at the transmitter to leverage the advantages of multi-
ple antennas [4]–[8]. The authors in [4] proposed and analyzed
TAS for PLS multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap
channels with receiver combining schemes. Later on, in [5],
secure transmission of multiple-input multiple-output multiple
eavesdropper (MIMOME) wiretap channels was addressed by
employing TAS with receive generalized selection combining
over Nakagami-m channels. Besides, considering the outdated
channel state information (CSI) at the transmitter, general-
order TAS was proposed to enhance the secrecy performance
of MIMOME [6]. Furthermore, the work in [7] studied the
secrecy outage performance of multiple-input single-output
(MISO) wiretap channel, where MRT scheme is adopted at
the BS with outdated CSI of the main channel. More recently,
regarding a wirelessly powered wiretap channel, both MRT
and TAS schemes at the source have been investigated in terms
of achievable secrecy outage probability and average secrecy
rate in [8].
Meanwhile, cooperative relaying techniques have aroused
extensive research interest due to its ability of increasing
2reliability and extending range of wireless networks with low
energy budget [11]. Recently, several cooperative relaying
schemes, for instance, decode-and-forward (DF), amplify-and-
forward (AF) and cooperative jamming (CJ), were exploited to
improve the security of dual-hop cooperative relaying systems.
Considering individual power constraint and no eavesdrop-
per’s CSI, a joint cooperative beamforming and jamming
scheme was proposed in [12] to enhance the security of
an amplify-and-forward (AF) relay network. In [13], hybrid
cooperative beamforming and jamming scheme was designed
to improve the PLS of two-way relay networks. For securing
a decode-and-forward (DF) two-hop cooperative network, the
work in [14] proposed an opportunistic relaying and artificial
jamming scheme with power allocation. Moreover, the work
in [15] coped with relay selection in cooperative networks
with secrecy constraint, where two nodes are selected to
forward source data and transmit an intentional interference
signal, respectively. In [16], two novel opportunistic relay
selection techniques incorporating the quality of the relay-
eavesdropper links were investigated for DF cooperative relay
networks. More recently, the security of cooperative single
carrier systems with multiple relays and multiple destinations
was examined in [17], where a two-stage relay and destination
selection scheme was proposed. Besides, in [18], PLS in DF
relaying cooperative wireless networks was studied, where
the cooperative nodes can be assigned as either jammers or
relays in an attempt to minimize the secrecy outage probability.
Among the aforementioned works, high SNR assumption at
the relay was considered, therefore the relay can decode the
information correctly. This hypothesis of decoding without
errors at the relays is not applicable throughout the SNR
range. It is highlighting that the quality of the first hop also
has a significant impact on the PLS of wireless relaying
networks [19], [20]. In [19], the PLS of dual-hop relaying
networks employing DF protocol was investigated, where only
a set of relays are assumed to be able to successfully decode
the message. Specifically, in a very recent work [20], the
secrecy outage performance of dual-hop regenerative multi-
relay systems with relay selection was investigated. In this
work, the authors assumed that the relay may suffer from a
wrong decision, and thus the rate is limited by the minimum
quality of the dual-hop links. Additionally, in [21], outage
constrained secrecy throughput maximization for DF relay
networks was investigated, where two-hop signals are both
taken into consideration to guarantee the transmission security.
In an effort to further enhance the secrecy performance of
wireless networks, a plethora of works have suggested the idea
of incorporating multiuser diversity techniques into the system.
Recently, in [22], the PLS of cognitive radio networks with
different multiuser scheduling schemes was investigated in
terms of the achievable secrecy rate and intercept probability.
Moreover, in [23], an optimal user selection scheme for mul-
tiuser relaying scheme with cooperative jamming (MUCJ) was
proposed and optimized by maximizing the secrecy rate. Be-
sides, in [24], the secrecy performance of multiuser downlink
networks with the help of the artificial noise was addressed by
designing an optimal power allocation to maximize the total
ergodic secrecy rate of the system. Notably, the key limitations
behind [22]–[24] are the high complexity and feedback load
of scheduling algorithms due to the continuous estimation
of the legitimate links. Specifically, in a recent work [25],
a threshold-based branch selection scheme termed as switch-
and-examine combining (SEC) was introduced to make a good
tradeoff between secrecy performance and implementation
complexity for MIMO wiretap channels. Later, a more prefer-
able alternative namely SEC with post-examining selection
(SECps) was designed to achieve a better secrecy performance
in multiuser downlink wiretap networks [26], [27]. In [28],
the physical layer security with TAS and threshold-based
selection diversity (tSD) scheme was investigated in multiuser
multi-antenna wireless networks. The key difference between
SEC and SECps scheduling schemes is that SEC scheme
selects any branch randomly when no acceptable one is found
after examining all the legitimate links, whereas the best
branch is selected in the SECps scheme, which guarantees
the secrecy performance particularly for the case when the
switching threshold is a high value. Noteworthy, in some
practical scenarios, the legitimate users and eavesdroppers
may be far away from the BS or in a deep shadow fading
environment [29]–[33]. Therefore, it is of importance to seek
the assistance of a trusted cooperative relay to perform the
complete transmission. However, to the best of the authors’
knowledge, the cooperative relay assisted multiuser multi-
antenna secure transmission with SECps scheduling scheme
has not been studied yet. Moreover, the impact of both
antenna configurations at each terminal and the fading severity
of involved channels on the secrecy performance remains
unexplored. Additionally, due to the fact that the confiden-
tial messages for the legitimate users have been overheard
by multiple multi-antenna eavesdroppers, and thus how the
eavesdropping modes adopted at the wiretappers affect the
secrecy performance of the considered network has not been
reported in the literature.
Enlightened by the above observations, in this paper, we
investigate secure transmission in dual-hop regenerative re-
laying multiuser multiple antenna networks over Nakagami-
m channels. To exploit the advantages of multiple antennas,
a maximal ratio transmission (MRT) scheme is adopted at
the BS to improve the channel quality of the first hop. In
order to reduce the feedback load and implementation com-
plexity, the SECps scheme is utilized to select an acceptable
user for transmission without continuous estimations of all
the main channels’ quality in the second hop. Besides, we
consider a rather realistic assumption of imperfect decoding
at the relays, i.e., the messages decoded at relays may be
incorrect. Finally, due to the fact that malicious eavesdrop-
ping attacks significantly threaten the security of multiuser
wireless communications, we take into account two different
eavesdropping scenarios, i.e., the colluding and non-colluding
eavesdropping modes [34], [35]. For such a practical system
model, we pursue a comprehensive investigation on the secrecy
performance for two different cases based on the availability of
the eavesdropper’s CSI, i.e., Case I, where the eavesdropper’s
CSI is unavailable at the relay, and Case II, where the relay
has full knowledge about the eavesdropper’s CSI. The main
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
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Fig. 1: System model
When the eavesdropper’s CSI is unavailable at the
relay:
 We derive novel exact closed-form expressions for the
secrecy outage probability of both colluding and non-
colluding eavesdropping scenarios with arbitrary number
of legitimate users and eavesdroppers and number of
antennas equipped at BS, legitimate users and eavesdrop-
pers, fading factors of both hops as well as the switching
threshold. Based on these expressions, the impact of key
system parameters on the secrecy performance of dual-
hop regenerative relay multiuser wiretap networks can be
characterized.
 In order to achieve more insights, we derive new closed-
form approximations for the secrecy outage probability in
high SNR regimes for both colluding and non-colluding
eavesdropping scenarios. Our results reveal that the secre-
cy diversity order of the considered system is determined
by the worse hop and directly proportional to the number
of antennas and channel fading severity associated with
the corresponding legitimate link, which is independent
of the number of legitimate users NB and eavesdroppers
NE, the number of antennas at eavesdroppers AE as well
as fading factor of the eavesdropper’s channel mE.
When the eavesdropper’s CSI is available at the relay:
 We derive novel exact closed-form expressions for the
ergodic secrecy rate, which enable us to accurately ex-
amine the impact of the system parameters on the ergodic
secrecy rate of the considered networks.
 We further derive new compact approximated expressions
for the ergodic secrecy rate in the high SNR regimes.
From the asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate, the secrecy
multiplexing gain and power cost are quantized for both
colluding and non-colluding eavesdropping scenarios.
Notation: The bold lower/upper case letters denote vec-
tors/matrices. y denotes the conjugate transpose operator, E []
stands for the expectation operator, kk2F accounts for the
Frobenius norm, IM denotes theMM identity matrix, and n!
denotes the factorial of integer n.   () is the Gamma function,
 (; ) and   (; ) denote the lower and upper incomplete Gam-
ma functions [44, Eqs. (8.350.1) and (8.350.2)], respectively.
II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODELS
As illustrated in Fig. 1, we consider a dual-hop relaying
wiretap network, in which one BS (A) communicates NB
legitimate users (B) with the help of a trustful regenerative
relay (R), and is overheard by NE eavesdroppers (E). The
BS, each legitimate users and each eavesdropper are equipped
with AA, AB and AE antennas, respectively. It is highlighting
that this configuration has numerous practical applications, for
instance, in wireless sensor networks (WSN) where the multi-
antenna nodes convey information via a mobile relay that is
restricted to a single antenna due to cost and size limita-
tions, or in device-to-device (D2D) communications scenarios
where the relay assists two multi-antenna devices to exchange
messages [36]–[42]. Moreover, we follow the similar scenario
in [15], [16], [20], [29]–[33], where both of the direct links
A ! B and A ! E are assumed to be nonexistent, due to
the direct links may be blocked by an obstruction or suffer
from severe shadow fading. By this way, the transmission in
the first hop cannot be overheard by Eves.
Throughout this paper, the following assumptions are con-
sidered: 1) The CSI of the legitimate link and the eavesdrop-
per’s link is available at Bob and Eve, respectively. 2) The
links A ! R, R ! B, and R ! E are subjected to quasi-
static fading link with independent non-identically distributed
block Nakagami-m fading.
We assume that the relay operates in a half-duplex manner,
and thus the transmission between the BS and legitimate
users consists of two time slots. At the first time slot,
the BS encodes the message block w into a codeword x
= [x (1) ; :::; x (j) ; :::x (n)] with 1n
Pn
k=1 E
h
jx (k)j2
i
 PA
based on capacity achieving codebook for the wiretap channel.
Since the BS is equipped with multiple antennas, we adopt
maximal ratio transmission scheme to maximize the channel
quality of A ! R link. As such, the instantaneous SNRs of
the first hop at the relay can be expressed as
AR=
PA
2R
khARk2F (1)
where PA denotes the transmit power at the BS, hAR repre-
sents an AA  1 vector for the A! R channel whose entries
follow i.i.d. Nakagami-m fading with parameter mA, and 2R
denotes the variance of additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
at the relay.
At the second time slot, the relay re-encodes the messages
and re-transmits them to Bob. In addition, since both legitimate
users and eavesdroppers are equipped with multiple antennas,
maximal ratio combining (MRC) is adopted at Bob and Eve to
strengthen the signal detection. Hence, the instantaneous SNR
of each legitimate user and eavesdropper are, respectively,
given by
bk=
PR
2B
khRB (k)k2F ; 1  k  NB (2)
and
ej=
PR
2E
khRE (j)k2F ; 1  j  NE (3)
4where hRB (k) represents the channel vector between the k-
th legitimate user and the relay, and hRE (j) represents the
channel vector between the j-th eavesdropper and the relay,
PR denotes the transmit power at the relay, 2B and 2E denote
the variance of AWGN at Bob and Eve, respectively.
Different from the high SNR assumption [15], [16] or
perfect decoding [17], [18] at the relay, we follow a similar
consideration as in [20] and take into account the impact of
the quality of the first hop on the secrecy rate. Therefore, the
secrecy capacity of dual-hop DF relay system Cs is given by
[20]
Cs = 1
2

log2

1 + AB
1 + RE
+
(4)
where RE and AB denote the instantaneous SNRs of R! E
link and A ! R ! B link, respectively. Additionally, the
parameter 1=2 accounts for the fact that the transmission
process completes in two time slots and
[x]
+
= max (x; 0) =

x; x  0
0; x < 0
(5)
Considering DF scheme at the relay, we have
AB = min (AR; RB) (6)
where RB denotes the instantaneous SNR of R! B link.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide a comprehensive analysis on the
achievable secrecy performance of the considered system with
two different eavesdropper’s scenarios, i.e., the colluding and
non-colluding eavesdropping scenarios.
A. Preliminaries
Before delving into the detail analysis, we first present the
basic principle of the multiuser scheduling in this paper, i.e.,
the SECps scheme [43] as follows:
To relieve the feedback load and estimation complexity,
we adopt SECps scheduling scheme to select an acceptable
legitimate user for data transmission. To facilitate the analysis,
the SECps scheme can be equivalently viewed as selection
combining (SC) scheme with an output threshold (OT-SC).
Therefore, relying on the analysis of NB users with OT-SC,
we first characterize the CDF of RB. On account of the
events that selecting an acceptable legitimate user are mutually
exclusive, thus, according to the total probability theorem, the
CDF of RB is given by
FRB (x) = Pr [RB < x]
=
NBX
n=1
Pr

RB=max

b1 ; 
b
2 ; :::; 
b
n
	
&RB<x

(7)
where RB = max

b1 ; 
b
2 ; :::; 
b
n
	
indicates that an n-user
SC is employed. Recalling the characterization, we find that
1) An individual user is selected if its channel quality SNR
exceeds the threshold, i.e., RB = b1  T.
2) An n-user SC scheme (2  n  NB   1) is adopt-
ed for the legitimate users when the instantaneous SNR
of an n  1 user SC is smaller than the threshold, while
the instantaneous SNR of the n-user exceeds the threshold,
i.e., RB = max

b1 ; 
b
2 ; :::; 
b
n 1
	
< T and RB =
max

b1 ; 
b
2 ; :::; 
b
n
	
= bn > T.
3) An NB-user SC is employed for the legitimate users if
the instantaneous SNR of an (NB   1)-user SC is below the
threshold, i.e., max

b1 ; 
b
2 ; :::; 
b
NB 1
	
< T.
Following the similar steps as developed in [43] and assum-
ing an independent identically distributed Nakagami-m fading
for the main channels, we have the following key results.
Lemma 1. The CDF and PDF of RB are, respectively,
expressed as
FRB (x)=
8><>:
1 
NB 1P
n=0
h
F
bk
(T)
in h
1 F
bk
(x)
i
; x > Th
F
bk
(x)
iNB
; x < T
(8)
and
fRB (x) =
8><>:
NB 1P
n=0
h
Fbk (x)
in
fbk (x) ; x > T
NB
h
Fbk (x)
iNB 1
fbk (x) ; x < T
(9)
where
Fbk (x) = 1  exp

 mBx
B
ABmBX
k=0
(x)
k
k!

mB
B
k
(10)
and
fbk (x) =

mB
B
ABmB xABmB 1
  (ABmB)
exp

 mB
B
x

(11)
represent the CDF and PDF of bk , respectively, B = E

bk

denotes the average SNR of each legitimate channel, mB is
the Nakagami-m fading factor of legitimate channel.
Since the MRT scheme is adopted for the A ! R link, we
have the following key Lemma.
Lemma 2. The exact CDF and PDF of AR are, respectively,
provided by
FAR (x) = 1  exp

 mA
A
x
mAAA 1X
n=0
xn
n!

mA
A
n
(12)
and
fAR (x) =

mA
A
AAmA xAAmA 1
  (AAmA)
exp

 mA
A
x

(13)
where A = E [AR].
On the other hand, we consider two eavesdropping modes
in this paper, i.e., colluding and non-colluding eavesdropping
[34], [35]. For non-colluding eavesdropping, the eavesdrop-
pers overhear the confidential message independently without
cooperative processing. In other words, secure transmission
of main channel can be achieved under the condition that
the quality of legitimate channel is better than that of any
wiretapper’s channel. As such, the end-to-end instantaneous
SNR of R! E link is determined by

(ncol)
RE = max
1jNE
ej (14)
5While for colluding eavesdropping, the eavesdroppers ex-
change their observations at a centralized processing module
to jointly decode the message, and thus the end-to-end instan-
taneous SNR of R! E link is given by

(col)
RE =
NEX
j=1
ej (15)
To do that, we have the following lemmas.
Lemma 3. For the colluding eavesdropping scenario, the
exact CDF and PDF of (col)RE are, respectively, given by
F (col)RE (x) = 1  exp

 mE
E
x
NEmEAE 1X
n=0
xn
n!

mE
E
n
(16)
and
f (col)RE (x) =

mE
E
NEAEmE xNEAEmE 1
  (NEAEmE)
exp

 mE
E
x

(17)
Lemma 4. For the non-colluding eavesdropping scenario, the
exact CDF and PDF of (ncol)RE are, respectively, given by
F (ncol)RE (x) =
NEX
v=0

NE
v

( 1)v exp

 mEv
E
x

E;v

mE
E
x
E (18)
and
f (ncol)RE (x) =
NE
  (AEmE)
NE 1X
v=0

NE   1
v

( 1)vE;v


mE
E
E+AEmE
xE+AEmE 1 exp

 mE (v + 1)
E
x

(19)
where
E;v =
vX
n1=0
n1X
n2=0
:::
nmEAE 2X
nmEAE 1=0
v!
nmEAE 1!

mEAE 1Y
t=1
(t!)
nt+1 nt
(nt 1   nt)!
(20)
with n0 = v; nmE = 0; E =
PmEAE 1
q=1 nq, E = E

ej

denotes the average SNR of each wiretap channel.
Proof: The proof can be found in [6].
B. Scenario I: Eavesdropper’s CSI is unavailable at the relay
In this subsection, we focus on the scenario where the
relay does not have knowledge of the eavesdropper’s CSI and
therefore the instantaneous capacity of the wiretap channel
(i.e., CE = log2 (1 + E)) is not available at the relay.
Under this condition, the relay supposes the instantaneous
capacity of the eavesdropper’s channel as ~CE = CB   Rs to
perform secure data transmission [1], where Rs is a constant
secrecy rate selected by the BS and relay. If CE < ~CE, i.e.,
the eavesdropper’s channel is worse than the estimation, the
perfect secrecy can be achieved. Otherwise, if CE > ~CE,
the eavesdropper is capable of overhearing the confidential
message and the secrecy is compromised. In doing so, the
secrecy outage probability and non-zero secrecy capacity are
taken into consideration as primary and well-accepted metrics
to evaluate the secrecy performance of the considered system.
1) Secrecy outage probability: The secrecy outage proba-
bility is defined as the probability that the achievable secrecy
capacity Cs is lower than a predefined secrecy transmission
rate Rs. Mathematically, the secrecy outage probability is for-
mulated as Pout (Rs) = Pr (Cs < Rs). Following the similar
procedures developed in [20], the secrecy outage probability
is re-expressed as
P()out (Rs) = Pr
h
min (AR; RB) < 
i
=
Z 1
0
h
FAR () + FRB () FAR ()
FRB ()
i
f ()RE (x)dx
(21)
where  2 fcol ; ncolg,  =  (1 + x)   1 and  = 22Rs .
Now, an exact closed-form expression for (21) can be derived
in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The secrecy outage probability of the considered
system is derived as
P()out (Rs) = I()1 + I()2 + I()3 (22)
where  2 fcol ; ncolg. For colluding eavesdropping scenari-
o, I()1 , I()2 and I()3 are presented in (23), (25) and (27),
respectively, while for non-colluding eavesdropping scenario,
I()1 , I()2 and I()3 are provided by (24), (26) and (28),
respectively.
Proof: See Appendix A.
We remark that the secrecy outage probability of the
considered system is separated by three parts for tractable
reasons, i.e., I()1 ; I()2 and I()3 , in which I()1 represents the
joint impacts of the parameters related to the A ! R and
R! E links, I()2 reflects the joint impacts of the parameters
related to the R ! B and R ! E links, and I()3 reflects
the joint impacts of the parameters related to the A ! R,
R ! B and R ! E links on the secrecy performance. Thus,
based on the derived closed-form secrecy outage probability
expressions, we can readily evaluate the secrecy performance
of the considered system.
In addition, we also find that the A ! R link is involved
in the secrecy outage performance although the A ! E link
is assumed to be unavailable. This is due to the fact that
the imperfect decoding assumption is adopted at the relay,
and therefore the transmission rate is limited by the minimum
quality of the dual-hop links.
Please note, other secrecy performance metrics can be easily
calculated from (22), for instance, the probability of positive
secrecy can be evaluated by setting Rs = 0 into (22), and
therefore we have the following key result.
6I(col)1 = 1 

mE
E
NEAEmE
 (NEAEmE)
fP
A;k1
  (NEAEmE + k1) (S2ae) (NEAEmE+k1) (23)
I(ncol)1 = NE (AEmE)
NE 1P
v=0
 
NE 1
v

( 1)vE;v

mE
E
E+AEmE 
  (E+AEmE)

mE(v+1)
E
 (E+AEmE)  fPA;k1
  (E +AEmE + k1) (S2aev) (E+AEmE+k1)
 (24)
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Corollary 1. The probability of positive secrecy of the con- sidered system is quantified by Pr() (Cs > 0) = 1 P()out (0),
7I(ncol)3a =   NE (AEmE)
NE 1P
v=0
 
NE 1
v

( 1)vE;v

mE
E
E+AEmE( NBP
l=0
 
NB
l

( 1)lexp

 mB( 1)lB

B;l

mB( 1)
B
B

BP
s=0
 
B
s


 1
s 
(S0bev) (E+AEmE+s) (E+AEmE+s;S0bev@T) fPA;k1(S0abev) (E+AEmE+k1+s)
  (E+AEmE+k1+s;S0abev@T)

+

 

E+AEmE;

mE(v+1)
E

@T

mE(v+1)
E
 (E+AEmE)
 fPA;k1   (E +AEmE + k1; S2aev@T  (S2aev) (E+AEmE+k1)  fPB;n1(S2bev) (E+AEmE+n1)
  (E+AEmE+n1;S2bev@T)+fPA;k1fPB;n1(S2abev) (E+AEmE+k1+n1)   (E+AEmE+k1+n1;S2abev@T) 
)
(28a)
I(ncol)3b =   NE (AEmE)
NE 1P
v=0
 
NE 1
v

( 1)vE;v

mE
E
E+AEmE(
  (E +AEmE)

mE(v+1)
E
 (E+AEmE)  fPA;k1
  (E +AEmE + k1) (S2aev) (E+AEmE+k1)  fPB;n1 (S2bev) (E+AEmE+n1)  (E+AEmE+n1)  fPA;k1
  (E+AEmE+k1+n1) (S2abev) (E+AEmE+k1+n1)
) (28b)
where  2 fcol ; ncolg.
2) Asymptotic secrecy outage probability: Though the ex-
act closed-form expression for secrecy outage probability of
multiuser regenerative relay systems has been derived, it is
not easy to explore the impact of key system parameters on
the secrecy performance from (22). Thus, in order to gain
more insights, we turn our attention to the asymptotic secrecy
outage probability in high SNR regimes, i.e., B !1. Unless
otherwise specified, we assume that the average SNR of the
A ! R link is equal to that of R ! B link, i.e., A = B,
and we have the following important result.
Corollary 2. Based on (22), the asymptotic secrecy outage
probability of the considered system in high SNR regimes is
given by
P()out (Rs) =

()  B
 	
+O  B 	 (29)
where the secrecy diversity gain 	 is
	 =
8<: mBAB; mAAA = mBABmBAB; mAAA > mBAB
mAAA; mAAA < mBAB
(30)
and the secrecy coding gain () is given by
()=
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
8>>>><>>>>:


()
1 + 
()
g
 1
; mAAA = mBAB & @T  0

()
g
 1
; mAAA > mBAB & @T  0

()
1
 1
; mAAA < mBAB & @T  08>>>><>>>>:


()
1 + 
()
s
 1
; mAAA = mBAB & @T < 0

()
s
 1
; mAAA > mBAB & @T < 0

()
1
 1
; mAAA < mBAB & @T < 0
(31)
where  2 fcol ; ncolg, O () denotes the higher order term,

()
1 is provided as (32) and (33), 
()
g is provided as (34)
and (35), ()s is provided as (36) and (37), respectively.
Proof: See Appendix B.
According to the asymptotic expressions of secrecy outage
probability in (29), we find that the secrecy diversity order is
determined by the worse hop and directly proportional to the
number of antennas and channel fading severity associated
with the A ! R link or R ! B link. For instance, if
mAAA  mBAB, then the secrecy diversity order is equiva-
lent to mBAB, and vice versa. We remark that the secrecy
diversity order is independent of the number of legitimate
users NB and eavesdroppers NE, the number of antennas at
eavesdroppers AE, the average SNR of eavesdropper’s channel
E and the corresponding fading factor mE.
On the other hand, the impacts of the involved parameters
on the secrecy outage performance are characterized by the
secrecy coding gain in (31), respectively. In addition, we also
remark that, the secrecy diversity order remains the same,
while they differ in the secrecy coding gain.
C. Scenario II: Eavesdropper’s CSI is available at the relay
In this subsection, we focus on the scenario that the relay
has the eavesdropper’s CSI. Under this condition, the transmit-
ter has an ability to change the coding rate adaptively depend-
ing on both CSIs of the legitimate link and eavesdropper’s link
to achieve the perfect security. Thus, any ergodic transmission
rate below the ergodic secrecy rate of the channel is achievable
by principle [1]. As such, different from Scenario I, the ergodic
secrecy rate is taken here as the principle secrecy performance
metric.
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1) Ergodic Secrecy Rate: According to [6], the ergodic
secrecy rate of the considered system is given by
C()s =
1
2
Z 1
0
Z 1
y
h
log2 (1 + x)  log2 (1 + y)
i
fAB (x) f ()RE (y) dxdy
(38)
Now, a closed-form expression for (38) can be derived in the
following theorem.
Theorem 2. The ergodic secrecy rate of the considered system
C()s for colluding eavesdropping and non-colluding eaves-
dropping scenarios are given by (39) and (40), respectively,
where  2 fcol ; ncolg.
Proof: See Appendix C.
2) Asymptotic Ergodic Secrecy Rate: In order to further
characterise the impact of key system parameters on the
ergodic secrecy rate, we do a high SNR evaluation on the
ergodic secrecy rate of the considered systems. In doing so,
two new metrics, i.e., the secrecy multiplexing gain and the
power cost are exploited to quantify the asymptotic ergodic
secrecy rate, and thus we have the following important results.
Corollary 3. The asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate of the
considered system in the high SNR regime is given by
C()s 1  G1   G()2 ; (41)
where  2 fcol ; ncolg is provided by (42) and G()2 is given
by (43) and (44), respectively.
Proof: See Appendix D.
As in the traditional non-secrecy system, we proceed to
evaluate the behavior of ergodic secrecy rate in terms of
the secrecy multiplexing gain and the power cost. To make
the analysis more tractable, a general form to describe the
asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate is exploited as
C()s 1  `1

log2B  $()1

; (45)
where `1 is the secrecy multiplexing gain in bits/s/Hz(3dB)
and $()1 denotes the power cost in 3dB units. According to
[6], with the help of (41), the secrecy multiplexing gain can
be derived as
`1 = lim
B!1
C()s 1
log2B
=
1
2
(46)
Building on (46), which shows that under these config-
urations, the considered multiuser cooperative transmission
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obtains the same spectral efficiency as the scenarios without
wiretappers.
Then, we focus on the power cost $()1 . Mathematically, it
can be written as
$()1 = lim
B!1
 
log2B  
C()s 1
`1
!
(47)
It is worth noting that (47) definitely evaluates the impact of
the BS to relay channel, legitimate channel and the wiretap
channel on the ergodic secrecy rate. Therefore, by inserting
(41) and (46) into (47), we obtain
$()1 = $1 (AA;mA; AB;mB) +$
()
1 (NE; AE;mE) (48)
where
$1 (AA;mA; AB;mB) =  
1
ln 2
(
(mA)
AAmA
  (AAmA)
mBAB 1X
n=0
(mB)
n
n!
   (AAmA + n)
(mA +mB)
AAmA+n

 (AAmA + n)  ln (mA +mB)

+
(mB)
ABmB
  (ABmB)
AAmA 1X
k=0
(mA)
k
k!
  (ABmB + k)
(mA +mB)
ABmB+k


 (ABmB + k)  ln (mA +mB)
)
(49)
and
$()1 (NB; NE; AE;mE) = 2G()2 (50)
Based on the description above, we drawn a conclusion
that the positive impact of main channel is characterized by
$
()
1 (AA;mA; AB;mB), and the negative impact of eaves-
dropper’s channel is characterized by $()1 (NE; AE;mE). In
addition, $()1 (NE; AE;mE) also explicitly quantifies the loss
of ergodic secrecy rate due to the behavior of the wiretapping
at Eves.
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Fig. 2: Secrecy outage probability versus B for colluding
eavesdropping with NB=2, NE=AE=mE=2, T=20dB and
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Once again, it is observed that for both eavesdropping
modes, the secrecy multiplexing gain remains the same, while
they differ in the power cost.
IV. SIMULATIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, numerical results are presented to validate
the aforementioned analysis and investigate the joint impact
of key system parameters on the secrecy performance of the
considered system.
Fig. 2 illustrates the secrecy outage probability of the dual-
hop multiuser regenerative relay system versus different SNR
B for colluding eavesdropping scenario. As observed in this
figure, we can see that the exact analytical results P(col)out (Rs)
in (22) match precisely with the Monte Carlo simulations,
and the asymptotic curves P1 (col)out (Rs) in (29) approximate
the exact ones quite well in the high SNR regime, which
demonstrates the correctness of the theoretical analysis.
Furthermore, as expected, increasing the predetermined
secrecy rate Rs degrades the secrecy performance, while the
asymptotic curves keep parallel for each secrecy rate Rs. We
also find that our asymptotes accurately predict the secrecy
diversity order and secrecy array gain. As indicated in this
figure, the secrecy diversity order is equal to AAmA when
AAmA < ABmB, e.g., (AA = 2;mA = 1; AB = 2;mB = 2),
while the secrecy diversity order is ABmB when
AAmA  ABmB, e.g., (AA = 2;mA = 2; AB = 1;mB = 1)
and (AA = 2;mA = 2; AB = 2;mB = 2), respectively.
Fig. 3 investigates the secrecy outage probability against
switching threshold T for colluding eavesdropping scenario.
It is observed that, the secrecy performance improves as the
switching threshold T grows up. Increasing the number of
antennas equipped at the BS and the number of legitimate
users or the number of legitimate users have a positive impact
on the secrecy performance. As can be seen, it is favorable
to put more antennas at legitimate users, which brings about
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the improvement of secrecy performance especially in low
switching threshold regime. However, increasing the num-
ber of colluding eavesdroppers or antennas equipped at the
eavesdroppers results in more powerful wiretapping capability,
which inevitably deteriorates the secrecy performance of the
considered system.
Fig. 4 depicts the secrecy outage probability versus different
B for non-colluding eavesdropping scenario of the considered
system. It is illustrated in this figure that the theoretical
results P(ncol)out (Rs) in (22) are in exact agreement with the
Monte Carlo simulations, and the asymptotic curves well
approximate the exact ones at the high SNR regimes. Similar
to the colluding eavesdropping scenario, the asymptotic curves
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P1 (ncol)out (Rs) in (29) precisely predict the secrecy diversity
order and secrecy array gain. As indicated in this figure, the
secrecy diversity order also can be divided into three types as
characterized in colluding eavesdropping scenario.
Fig. 5 illustrates a comparison of the secrecy outage prob-
ability between colluding eavesdropping and non-colluding
eavesdropping of the considered system. We mainly evaluate
the impact of eavesdropping parameters on the secrecy per-
formance. It is observed that the secrecy outage performance
deteriorates profoundly as the ratio of B=E decreases.
Furthermore, colluding eavesdropping results in larger secrecy
outage than non-colluding eavesdropping since the colluding
eavesdroppers are capable of sharing their observations and
decoding the messages jointly. Specifically, in Fig. 5 (a) and
(b), we can see that increasing the number of eavesdroppers
or the number of antennas at eavesdroppers in colluding
eavesdropping leads to a poorer secrecy performance than that
of non-colluding eavesdropping.
Fig. 6 depicts the ergodic secrecy rate of the considered
system versus different B for colluding eavesdropping. We
observe that the analytical results for ergodic secrecy rate
C(col)s in (39) well match with the Monte Carlo simulations,
and the asymptotic curves C(ncol)s in (41) approximate the
theoretical ones very well in the high SNR regime, which
demonstrates the correctness of our derived expressions. It is
shown that increasing the number of antennas equipped at the
BS and at legitimate user contributes to larger secrecy capacity
improvement than increasing the channel quality of first hop
and that of legitimate channel in the second hop. Fig. 7 shows
that the ergodic secrecy rate improves with the increase of the
switching threshold T. More legitimate users are examined as
the switching threshold increases, which results in a preferable
performance at the cost of higher estimation complexity. It
is worth noting that when T comes close to infinity, the
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Fig. 6: Ergodic secrecy rate versus B for colluding eaves-
dropping with NB = 2; NE = mE = AE = 2; T = 30dB
and 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Fig. 7: Ergodic secrecy rate versus 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secrecy performance floor occurs. As demonstrated in the
figure, the number of legitimate users and antennas at them in
high T regime leave a positive impact on the ergodic secrecy
performance, while increasing the number of eavesdroppers
and the antennas equipped at them will deteriorate secrecy
performance.
Fig. 8 examines the ergodic secrecy rate against different B
for non-colluding eavesdropping scenario. As can be readily
observed, the analytical results C(ncol)s in (40) are in exact
agreement with the Monte Carlo simulations, and the approx-
imated expression C(ncol)s 1 in (41) operates quite well with the
analytical ones at high SNR regime. It is noted that the ergodic
secrecy rate increases with the antennas equipped at the BS or
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Fig. 9: Ergodic secrecy rate comparison between collud-
ing eavesdropping and non-colluding eavesdropping with
AA=2;mA=1; NB=4; AB= 2;mB=1, Rs=2, and T=40dB.
For (a) AE=2;mE=1; For (b) NE=4;mE=1.
at the legitimate users. Besides, as can be expected, increasing
the numbers of antennas at the eavesdroppers improves the
quality of wiretap channel, which results in the increment of
the power cost $(col)1 , and therefore deteriorates the ergodic
secrecy rate of the considered networks.
Fig. 9 presents the ergodic secrecy rate comparison between
colluding eavesdropping and non-colluding eavesdropping. As
can be seen that, when the ratio of B=E reduces, the ergodic
secrecy rate will greatly lower the secrecy performance. For
Fig. 9 (a) and (b), the secrecy performance degrades with
increasing the number of eavesdroppers or the antennas at
eavesdroppers for both scenarios. From an intuitive perspec-
tive, more eavesdroppers or more antennas at the eavesdrop-
pers can strengthen wiretapping capability. Furthermore, we
discover that colluding eavesdropping imposes more hazardous
effect on the secrecy performance of the considered system
particularly for medium and high B settings.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented a comprehensive secrecy
performance analysis for multiuser regenerative relay wiretap
networks. Specifically, the imperfect decoding at the relay was
considered and threshold-based multiuser scheduling scheme
was adopted to acquire a good tradeoff between the system
complexity and secrecy performance. To quantify the secrecy
performance of the considered system, two practical situations
were addressed. i.e., Scenario I: the eavesdropper’s CSI is not
available at the relay and Scenario II: the eavesdropper’s CSI is
available at the relay. For both scenarios, we further considered
both colluding and non-colluding eavesdropping situations.
For Scenario I, we have derived exact closed-form expressions
of the secrecy outage probability for both two eavesdropping
modes, which presents an efficient and convenient approach
to characterize the secrecy performance. Besides, conducive
high SNR approximations for the secrecy outage probability
was provided, which enables further insights into the impact of
key system parameters on secrecy performance. For Scenario
II, we have concentrated on the analysis of the ergodic secrecy
rate achieved by the system. Specifically, new exact and
asymptotic closed-form expressions of ergodic secrecy rate
were derived for both two eavesdropping modes. With the
help of the analytical results, we also examined the secrecy
multiplexing gain and the power cost to explicitly evaluate
the influence of the legitimate channel and wiretap channel on
the ergodic secrecy rate. Our findings reveal that increasing
the switching threshold has a positive impact on secrecy
performance and it is preferable to put more antennas at BS
or legitimate users. In addition, compared with non-colluding
eavesdropping, colluding eavesdropping is more detrimental
to the considered system.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The secrecy outage probability in (21) can be separated in
three parts and the first one is given by
I()1 =
Z 1
0
FAR () f ()RE (x)dx (51)
For colluding eavesdropping scenario, by inserting (12) and
(17) into (51), resorting to [44, Eq. (3.326.2)] and binomial
theory, I(col)1 is provided in (23), where S2ae = mEE +
mA
A
and
gX
A;k1
= exp

 mA (  1)
A
AAmA 1X
k=0
(  1)k
k!


mA
A
k kX
k1=0

k
k1


  1
k1 (52)
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Similarly, for the non-colluding eavesdropping scenario, we
have I(ncol)1 as given in (24), where S2aev = mE(v+1)E +
mA
A
.
The second part for the secrecy outage probability of the
considered system is given by
I()2 =
Z 1
0
FRB () f ()RE (x)dx (53)
To make the analysis more tractable, here we introduce a new
bound point as @T =  1 (1 + T)  1. Therefore, I()2 can
be converted in a piecewise form with the bound point as
I()2 =
8><>:
R @T
0
FRB ()f ()RE (x) dx
+
R1
@T
FRB ()f ()RE (x) dx; @T  0R1
0
FRB ()f ()RE (x) dx; @T < 0
=
(
I()2a ; @T  0
I()2b ; @T < 0
(54)
For colluding eavesdropping scenario, by inserting (8) and
(17) into (54), with the assistance of [44, Eqs. (3.351.1),
(3.351.2) and (3.351.3)], I(col)2 is given as (25) after some
mathematical manipulations, where S0be = mEE +
mBl
B
,
S2be = mEE +
mB
B
,
gX
B;n1
= S1exp

 mB (  1)
B
mBAB 1X
n=0
(  1)n
n!


mB
B
n nX
n1=0

n
n1


  1
n1 (55)
and S1 =
NB 1P
k=0
"
1  exp

 mBTB
mBAB 1P
n=0
(T)
n
n!

mB
B
n#k
.
Similarly, for the non-colluding eavesdropping scenario,
I(ncol)2 is given by (26), where S0bev = mE(v+1)E +
mBl
B
,
B;l =
lX
n1=0
n1X
n2=0
:::
nmBAB 2X
nmBAB 1=0
l!
nmBAB 1!

mBAB 1Y
t=1
(t!)
nt+1 nt
(nt 1   nt)!
(56)
B =
PmBAB 1
q=1 nq; n0 = l; nABmB = 0, and S2bev =
mE(v+1)
E
+ mBB
.
The third part for the secrecy outage probability of the
considered system is given by
I()3 =  
Z 1
0
FAR ()FRB () f ()RE (x)dx (57)
Similar to the piecewise form with the bound point in (54),
I()3 can be further expressed as
I()3 =
8><>:
R @T
0
FAR ()FRB () f ()RE (x)dx+
R1
@T
FAR ()
FRB () f ()RE (x)dx; @T  0R1
0
FAR ()FRB () f ()RE (x)dx; @T < 0
=
(
I()3a ; @T  0
I()3b ; @T < 0
(58)
Thus, for colluding scenario, by inserting (8), (12), and
(17) into (58), resorting to [44, Eqs. (3.351.1), (3.351.2)
and (3.351.3)] and performing some mathematical operations,
I(col)3 is provided as (27), where S0abe = mAA +
mBl
B
+
mE
E
;S2ae = mAA +
mE
E
;S2be = mBB +
mE
E
, and S2abe =
mA
A
+ mBB
+ mEE
.
Similarly, for the non-colluding eavesdropping scenario,
I(ncol)3 is provided by (28), where S0bev = mE(v+1)E +
mBl
B
;S0abev = mAA +
mBl
B
+ mE(v+1)E
;S2aev = mAA +
mE(v+1)
E
, S2bev = mBB +
mE(v+1)
E
, and S2abev = mAA +
mB
B
+ mE(v+1)E
.
Hence, by summing up (23), (25) and (27) for colluding
eavesdropping scenario, the exact closed-form expression of
secrecy probability can be derived as (22) by following a
similar analysis for the non-colluding scenario.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2
In the high SNR regime, i.e., B !1, from (10), the CDF
of bk can be easily approximated as
Fbk (x) 
mB
mBAB
(mBAB)!

x
B
mBAB
(59)
By substituting (59) into (8), we have
FRB (x) 
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
1 
NB 1P
k=0

mB
mBAB
(mBAB)!

T
B
mBABk


1  mBmBAB(mBAB)!

x
B
mBAB
; x  T
mB
mBAB
(mBAB)!

x
B
mBABNB
; x < T
(60)
On the other hand, the CDF of AR is easily approximated as
FAR (x) 
mA
mAAA
(mAAA)!

x
A
mAAA
(61)
To this end, by pulling everything together in (21) and neglect-
ing the higher order terms, resorting to [44, Eqs. (3.351.1) and
(3.351.2)], the desired expressions can be easily obtained as
in (29) for both eavesdropping modes.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
To handle the double integrals in (38), we adopt the similar
approach as developed in [5]. To begin with, we evaluate
the inner integral by adopting integral by parts, and after
performing some mathematical operations, the ergodic secrecy
rate can be characterized as follows:
C()s =
1
2 ln 2
Z 1
0
F ()RE (y)
(1 + y)
Z 1
y
fAB (x)dx

dy
=
1
2 ln 2
Z 1
0
F ()RE (y)
(1 + y)

1 FAB (y)

dy
(62)
where
FAB (y) = FAR (y) + FRB (y) FAR (y)FRB (y) (63)
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Taking the threshold T into account, we have
C()s =
1
2 ln 2
Z T
0
F ()RE (y)
(1 + y)

1 FAB (y)

dy
+
Z 1
T
F ()RE (y)
(1 + y)

1 FAB (y)

dy
 (64)
By inserting (12) and (8) into (63) and resorting to binomial
theorem [44, Eq. (1.111)], after some simple mathematical
operations, the CDF of AB is provided as (65).
In proceeding, we plug (65) and (16) into (64) for colluding
eavesdropping scenario, (65) and (18) into (64) for non-
colluding eavesdropping scenario. With the help of [44, Eqs.
(1.111) and (8.350.2)], after performing some algebraic ma-
nipulations, the ergodic secrecy rate of the considered system
can be derived as (39) and (40), where
D(&; ; ) = exp (&)
X
1=0


1

( 1) 1& 1

h
  (1; &)    (1; & ( + 1))
i (66)
and
U(&; ; v) = exp (&)
X
1=0


1

( 1) 1& 1
  (1; & (v + 1))
(67)
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF COROLLARY 3
To facilitate the analysis, we modify the CDF of E as
F ()RE (y) = 1 + '()RE (y), thus, we have
'(col)RE (y) =   exp

 mEy
E
NEmEAE 1X
n=0
y n
n!

mE
E
n
(68)
and
'(ncol)RE (y) =
NEX
v=1

NE
v

( 1)v exp

 mEv
E
y

E;v


mE
E
E
y E
(69)
Hence, by changing the order of integral, the ergodic secrecy
rate can be re-expressed as
C()s 1 =
1
2 ln 2
Z 1
0
Z x
0
1 + '
()
RE (y)
1 + y
dyfB (x) dx = G1 + G()2
(70)
where
G1 = 1
2 ln 2
Z 1
0
ln (1 + x)fB (x) dx (71)
and
G()2 =
1
2 ln 2
Z 1
0
Z x
0
'
()
RE (y)
1 + y
fB (x) dydx (72)
Now, in the following, we concentrate on the evaluations of
G1 and G()2 in the high SNR regime, respectively. To begin
with, taking derivative of (63), the PDF for B can be derived
as follows:
fB (x) = fAR (x) (1 FRB (x)) + fRB (x) (1 FAR (x))
(73)
On the other hand, when B !1, the PDF and CDF of B
can be approximated respectively as
fRB (x) 

mB
B
ABmB xABmB 1
  (ABmB)
exp

 mB
B
x

(74)
and
FRB (x)  1  exp

 mBx
B
mBAB 1X
n=0
xn
n!

mB
B
n
(75)
Thus, by pulling (12), (13), (74) and (75) into (73), then
the PDF of B can be approximated as (76) with some
mathematical operations.
Besides, when B ! 1, we have ln (1 + B)  ln (B).
Finally, by inserting (76) and invoking [44, Eq.(4.352.1)], G1
is derived as (42), where  () is the digamma function [45].
Similarly, according to [46, Eq. (19)], G()2 is converted to
G()2 
1
2 ln 2
Z 1
0
'
()
E (y)
1 + y
dy (77)
Now, by substituting (68) to (77) for colluding eavesdropping,
(69) to (77) for the non-colluding eavesdropping, resorting
to [44, Eq. (3.353.5)] and performing some mathematical
manipulations, we have the corresponding results as provided
in (43) and (44). Eventually, by plugging G1 and G()2 into
(70), the proof is completed.
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